Throughout the interwar period, China’s efforts to revise its so-called “unequal treaties” reflected a dilemma shared by many (post-)colonial states: how to reconcile legal equality with economic self-determination. While treaty revisions promised the recovery of sovereign rights, they often preserved substantive inequalities – albeit under the guise of formal reciprocity. The “new treaties” (xinyue 新約) concluded by consecutive Chinese governments from the 1920s to the 1940s revealed how international law could reproduce imperial hierarchies in a new form. They also sparked intense debates within China itself: What did “self-determination” actually mean in treaty terms? Could equal terms on paper obscure unequal outcomes in practice? And how could sovereignty be reclaimed without surrendering economic autonomy? To illustrate these dilemmas, it is helpful to consider a concrete example.
The Sino-Belgian Treaty Dispute of 1926
On 6 November 1926, after months of fruitless negotiations with Brussels, the beleaguered Beijing government unilaterally terminated its 1865 Treaty of Commerce with Belgium. A landmark case in the interwar campaign to revise the 19th century “unequal treaties”, the Sino-Belgian treaty dispute captivated the international law community. While Beijing enlisted the expertise of prominent third-party jurists like Nicolas Politis, Robert Lansing, and Walther Schücking, Brussels referred the case to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague for adjudication.
The legality of Beijing’s action was – and remains – hotly contested. In the eyes of the American minister, John MacMurray, it constituted “a palpable perversion” of treaty clauses and proof that the Chinese regarded their international obligations as mere “scraps of paper”.1 For others, like Schücking, it demonstrated that “[t]he Chinese nation demands its right to self-determination with elemental force”.2

From Inequality to Conditionality
Before the World Court could rule on the matter, another treaty had been concluded between Brussels and the newly established National Government in Nanjing. Though nominally characterized by “parfaite égalité”, the new agreement made the relinquishment of Belgian extraterritorial rights conditional upon the gradual opening of China’s inland market to foreign nationals and capital.3 As would soon become clear, these new terms proved no less controversial than the ones they replaced.
Similar suspensory clauses were inserted into many other agreements concluded by both rival Chinese governments during the first half of the 20th century. The story of these “new treaties” stretches from the Sino-German agreement of 1921 – the first formally equal treaty the Chinese Republic ever concluded with a European great power – to the Sino-American trade agreement of 1946, signed but a few years before the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek’s government as a result of the Chinese Civil War.
Economic Conditionality as Informal Empire
My research revisits the fierce debate about these “new treaties” among Chinese political and diplomatic elites. In doing so, it also proposes a change of perspective: while scholarship has long focused on the modes of treaty revision, including uses of the rebus sic stantibus clause, much less attention has been paid to other issues – such as what made a treaty “unequal” in the first place, or what exactly replaced these “unequal treaties”.
Centering on conditionality clauses as an instrument of “informal empire”, my research finds that – for states like republican China no less than for Siam or the Ottoman Empire – formal equality often came at the price of an explicitly pro-free trade agenda.4 In other words, the recovery of sovereign rights like tariff autonomy and territorial jurisdiction was frequently bought by concessions in the economic realm.
A Trojan horse for an “alien invasion”
While the National Government and liberal reformers defended this trade-off as a necessary evil, it sparked fierce debate on both the left and the right. Radical jurists like Zhou Gengsheng denounced formal reciprocity as little more than a legal veil for neocolonial oppression.5 In their view, China had to resist demands for national treatment and protect its native industry from the destructive pressure of international capital. Meanwhile, the ultranationalist right portrayed the opening of China’s hinterland to foreigners as a Trojan horse for an “alien invasion” or even a “population exchange” – a view in turn criticized as myopic xenophobia by liberal reformers and foreign diplomats alike.6

Revisiting the Interwar History of Legal Imperialism
The populist language used in these debates sounds surprisingly familiar in the contemporary context of deglobalization, as concerns over “economic dependency” and “illegal migration” are gradually supplanting the previous enthusiasm for ever more open markets. This is no coincidence – after all, the controversy over China’s “new treaties” highlights recurring dilemmas faced by national elites: Does political independence necessarily entail a degree of economic autarky? At what point do legitimate concerns over foreign influence turn into blind xenophobia? Rather than offering simple answers to these questions, my research highlights the inherent – and, arguably, irresolvable – tension between legal equality and economic self-determination.
In addition to these conceptual questions, it suggests that the interwar decades more generally ought to be revisited within the historiography of legal imperialism. Rereading the interwar history of treaty revision through the lens of informal empire not only helps recover forgotten transnational entanglements linking states like China, Iran, Soviet Russia, or Weimar Germany. It also casts new light on the enduring legal and economic asymmetries that have shaped the postcolonial world.
- The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State, Peking, 19 August 1926, in: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1926, Vol. I, document 761; The Minister in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State, Peking, 12 November 1926, in: ibid, document 770. ↩︎
- Walther Schücking, “Die Frage der Kündigung des belgisch-chinesischen Handelsvertrages von 1865,” in: Die Reichsgerichtspraxis im deutschen Rechtsleben, Band 1: Öffentliches Recht, ed. Otto Schreiber (De Gruyter, 1929), 72-121, at 119-120. ↩︎
- Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Belgium and Luxemburg [比卢友好通商條約], with two accompanying notes and four declarations, done at Nanjing, 22 November 1928, in: 中外舊約章彙編 [Compilation of China’s Old Treaties], Vol. 3, 1919-1949, ed. Wang Tieya [王鐵崖] (1962), at 642-5. ↩︎
- For the concept of informal empire, see Jürgen Osterhammel, “Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis,” in: Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities, eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Jürgen Osterhammel (German Historical Institute, 1986), 290-314. ↩︎
- Zhou Gengsheng [周骾生], “對於中比中義兩約之商榷 [The discussion about the Sino-Belgian and Sino-Italian treaties],” in: Modern Review [現代評論], Vol. 9, Issue 209 (1928), 2-6. ↩︎
- See generally Zeng Youhao [曾友豪], “從國際法學的觀點批評中外新約 [A critique of China’s new treaties from the viewpoint of international law],” in: Eastern Miscellany [東方雜志], Vol. 26, Issue 14 (1929), 13-22. ↩︎







